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The issue of the nature of the altruism inherent in blood donation and the perverse effects of 
financial rewards for blood and/or organ donation has been recently revisited in the economic 
literature with limited consensus. As Titmuss (1970) famously pointed out, providing 
monetary incentives to blood donors may crowd out blood supply as purely altruistic donors 
may feel less inclined to donate if a reward is involved - in addition to having the effect of 
reducing blood quality. In this paper we take a different approach by focusing on the nature of 
the rewards. That is, we examine how favouring different types of incentives are related to the 
likelihood of donating blood by exploiting a large sample representative of 15 European 
countries in 2002. Our results show that donors are less likely to favour monetary rewards for 
blood donation but are more likely to favour non-monetary ones. This is consistent with the 
idea that while monetary rewards may crowd out blood donation, non-monetary rewards do 
not. 
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June 30, 2011 1 Introduction
There is increasing interest in the motivation of altruistic behaviour, not merely for the
sake of exploring behavioural drives which go beyond classical axioms of self-interest to
explain individual behaviour, but more recently as a means of correcting government
interventions which are held to crowd out individual actions. For example, the current
UK government has advocated the notion of a `big society' which, although rather
unclearly dened, appears to have altruistic behaviour as a central theme. While there
is much loose-talk centred around the denition of this policy tool, there is a growing
interest in whether such behaviour can be motivated through incentive mechanisms.
There has thus been interest in nudging behaviour towards pre-specied outcomes
such as tackling health inequalities, preventing ill-health, improving health outcomes
and spreading information and good health advice (Department of Health, 2011).
Possibly one of the most long-lasting and discussed examples of behaviour broadly
consistent with this notion of core altruistic behaviour is individual blood donation.
One donated unit of whole blood can save up to three lives but donated blood
has a short shelf life. Regular donors are therefore essential to secure a constant
supply. In 1997, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended that all blood
donations should come from unpaid voluntary donors. However, by 2006, only 49
of 124 countries surveyed had established this as a standard. Furthermore, in the
WHO's European region the number of donors varies from less than 4.5 to over 45
per 1000 general population. Only 39 per cent of the general population are eligible
to donate, and fewer than 5 per cent of those eligible actually donate.
Individuals might undertake certain altruistic actions guided by an extrinsic moti-
vation, including a `warm-glow' or moral satisfaction. Blood donation has often been
seen as a clear-cut example of `altruism with non-monetary pay-os' (Elster, 1990).
Nevertheless, the issue of the nature of the altruism inherent in blood donation is
yet to be agreed upon in the economic literature. Cooper and Culyer (1968) argue
that competition and monetary incentives would be suitable to motivate donors but
Titmuss (1970) famously points out that providing incentives to blood donors may
crowd out blood supply as purely altruistic donors may feel less inclined to donate
if a reward is involved. Solow (1971) and Arrow (1972) discuss this proposition and
suggest that the eects of price incentives can simply be added to those of altruistic
donation, and hence if the price of blood is raised, the total quantity oered would
1increase in accordance with a normal supply function. However, the question of the
eects of monetary incentives on altruistic behaviour has remained unresolved and
the phenomenon discussed by Titmuss was coined as motivation crowd-out. Trying
to answer the question of whether altruistic behaviour can be incentivised, Frey and
Jegen (2001), Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), and Benabou and Tirole (2006) point
out that intrinsic motivation may go unnoticed if a payment is oered.
In this paper, we explore whether nancial and non-nancial incentives have the
same eect on willingness to donate when other observed and unobserved factors are
controlled for. We answer this question by exploiting a large dataset representative
of fteen European countries containing information on whether or not an individual
has been a donor in the past and her preferences towards monetary and non-monetary
compensation for blood donation. This information allows estimation of two recursive
equation systems and exploration of the association of preferences for dierent types
of rewards and the probability of being a donor.
Our results are consistent with the hypothesis of blood supply crowding out due
to monetary incentives in all European countries. But, most importantly, we nd
no evidence of potential crowding out when non-monetary rewards are involved in
most European countries. These results are robust to dierent specications and are
coherent with the idea that crowding out is a phenomenon linked to the introduction
of a market based rationale for non-market decisions, and that socially motivated
individuals remain willing to donate when non-monetary rewards are oered.
Our results conrm and generalise recent ndings that monetary and non-monetary
rewards may not crowd out donation as long as self-interest is removed from them
(Mellstrom and Johannesson, 2008). The contribution of our present work to the ex-
tant literature is threefold. First, we use a large dataset representative of 15 European
countries instead of a small experimental sample. Second, we can directly analyse the
relationship of the respondents'preferences for monetary and non-monetary rewards
with the probability of being a donor. Third, our results are consistent with the idea
that altruistic behaviour can be incentivised as long as the rewards do not conceal
the identity of the blood giver as a `donor'.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section provides some background on
altruism and blood donation; section 3 describes our econometric model; section 4
discusses the results; and section 5 concludes.
22 Background
We rst present some background on the motivation behind blood donation as an
act of gift-giving and, more specically, how it relates to dierent forms of socially
motivated acts including altruism. We then discuss how the literature on blood
donation addresses the question of providing incentives for altruistic behaviour.
2.1 Blood Donation and Social Motivation
Blood donation has been classied as an act of `collective gift-giving' (Mercier Ythier,
2006). Donating blood is a pro-social act in the sense that donors incur individual
costs in exchange for a collective benet and contributes to ensuring the a the blood
supply system that works well.
In economic terms, blood donation, as any other donation or charitable act, is
an economic voluntary transfer that traditionally has not been motivated by market
exchange. As with any other donation, it implies some form of economic sacrice by
the giver in exchange for the receivers' benet for which the giver expects no return.
Moreover, since gift-giving individuals, or knights in the terminology of Le Grand
(1997, 2003), ought to care about the receivers' utility rather than their own pure
self-interest, theoretically it is envisaged as an act immune to strategic behaviour of
giving agents towards the givers (Kolm, 2000). Nevertheless, some forms of altruistic
behaviour take place partially as a result of a feeling of `duty' towards others (Etzioni,
1988), from the imitation of others' behaviours { especially of those individuals sig-
nalled as `reference groups'; from a feeling of social or moral indebtedness having been
or expecting to be on the receiving end on another occasion; or, even from identity
driven self-interested motivations (e.g., to attain a feeling of being a good person) as
we argue in this paper.
Empirically, most blood donors will give some altruistic reason for giving, often
citing feelings of community attachment or some commitment to the common good
as their motive (Healy, 2000). The latter paves the way for the development of an
identity as an altruist, which can be substantiated by a continuous act of blood
donation or not. Hence, blood donation can be considered a manifestation of impure
altruism, insofar as donors receive a direct moral satisfaction for their act beyond that
attributable to having contributed to the collective benet. In that sense, Wildman
and Hollingswoth (2009) examine the type and timing of blood donations between
3new and established donors. They nd no evidence that 0-negative donors (i.e., the
universal blood group compatible with all blood types and hence more valuable for
donation) donate more, suggesting no evidence of pure altruism. More precisely, in
some forms of impure altruism such as blood donation agents are said to receive a
warm-glow payo by taking an action they believe to be virtuous (Andreoni, 1990).
2.2 Blood Donation and Incentives
In his famous work, Titmuss (1971) reported evidence that nonmarket mechanisms
for blood donation are not only ethically superior but also more ecient. Indeed,
according to Titmuss, hepatitis rates from blood transfusions signicantly decreased
when the blood was donated rather than purchased, which was explained by the fact
that donors who are not paid for blood have no incentive to hide an illness, which lead
to a higher quality of blood in such systems. Moreover, a nancial reimbursement for
blood donation could induce those who are more `in need' of money to oversupply,
eliciting a `new supply' from non-altruistic individuals, who are in turn likely to
be less healthy. Reimbursement for blood would reduce the altruistic motivations
behind individuals' blood donation behaviour, producing a decline in supply from
those individuals, i.e. crowd-out. As mentioned, this seminal work led to Arrow's
(1972) and Solow's (1971) responses questioning the substitution of altruists by non-
altruists in line with Cooper and Culyer's (1968) arguments. Kessel (1974) added
that market mechanisms could provide guarantees for blood quality if accompanied
by screening techniques to ensure product accountability. Interestingly, Thorne (2000)
argued that with more eective exhortation, a donor system is capable of procuring
more organs at lower costs than market procurement. More recently, Andreoni et al.
(2008, p. 134) argue that `having a personal identity as an altruist may necessarily
precede altruistic acts' and that the use of monetary rewards would conict with such
identity and hence have unintended eect on individuals' altruistic motivations.
It is worth mentioning {even if briey{ that a string of theoretical papers dis-
cussing signalling models and crowding out have also touched upon the subject of
donation. These papers discuss how individuals engage in civic activities to signal
altruism. The introduction of monetary incentives may make signalling more dicult
and thus cause crowding out (Seabright, 2004; Benabou and Tirole, 2005).
There are very few empirical tests of Titmuss' claim but there exists some litera-
4ture about counter-productivity of monetary incentives for other situations (Gneezy
and Rustichini, 2000a, 2000b; Fehr and Falk, 2002; Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). Drawing
on Benabou and Tirole (2006), Ariely et al. (2009) model image motivation or the
desire to be liked and well-regarded by others as a driver in prosocial behavior and
analyse whether extrinsic monetary incentives have a detrimental eect on proso-
cial behavior due to the crowding out of image. They show and test this with an
experiment that monetary incentives crowd out image motivation.
The empirical papers most directly related to our current paper are Mellstrom
and Johannesson (2008) and Goette and Stutzer (2008). The former tests Titmuss'
proposition using a eld experiment with three groups of individuals: being a blood
donor with monetary compensation, with no compensation at all, and with a mon-
etary compensation which was given to charity. Introducing compensation is found
to crowd out blood donors only for women. Importantly, when charitable motivation
is introduced, crowding out is found to disappear. Goette and Stutzer (2008) nd
that oering lottery tickets to donors increases the turnout at blood drives among
infrequent donors, but there are no eects among frequent donors. Lastly, Wildman
and Hollingswoth (2009) examine the type and timing of blood donations between
new and established donors and nd a systematic dierence between the two groups.
They suggest that whilst the former would be sensitive to incentives, the established
donors' behaviour is driven primarily by social norms instead.
Most of the empirical studies suggest that crowding out is specic of the particular
settings individuals are in. Thus, we advocate that extrinsic motivation or rewards
for blood donation may take dierent meanings within each country's dierent social
norms, and hence we should expect dierential levels of crowding out by country.
Furthermore, not all rewards may crowd out an individual's identity as an altruist
(or a donor).
For the purpose of motivating our empirical exercise, we conclude this section by
suggesting that the eect of monetary incentives on blood supply can be modeled
by drawing on the concept of `donor identity'. Assume that blood donated enters
an individual's utility function, U(), by two means: positively through the (warm
glow) eect that it has on her self-image or self-identity I(:) as a donor, a gift-giver or
an altruist, and negatively as a direct consequence of the inconveniences associated
with donating blood. Also, monetary incentives for blood donation, r(a), increase
the income of the donor but aect negatively the donor's self-image or self-identity
5(@I
@r  0). The individual maximizes utility:
U = U(a;c;I;D) (1)
such that self-image I is
I = I(a;r(a);E) (2)
subject to the budget constraint
pc = w + r(a)a (3)
where a is the intensity of blood donation, c is a composite commodity with price p,
I is self-identity, D is a vector containing individual demographic characteristics and
the individual social environment, E represents other environmental factors which
include social norms, w is the wealth of the individual, and r(a) is the monetary
incentive given for blood donation. The (rearranged) rst-order condition for the
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Assuming concavity of utility function with respect to a, the rst-order condition
above illustrates how a negative eect on self-identity from receiving a monetary
reward for blood donation will decrease the optimal amount of donation.1 Note that
if the rewards to blood donation are not monetary, e r(a) and the utility function
depends positively on them, @U
@e r(a) > 0, the eect on blood donation is ambiguous





@e r e r0(a) = 0, and, thus the
comparison between a and a will depend on the relative magnitudes of @U
@e r and ,
which we cannot establish a priori.
In the next section, we describe our dataset and later we explain our empiri-
cal approach to test whether monetary and nonmonetary incentives are negatively
associated with blood donation.
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@a +r0(a) has a positive gradient evaluated at a. Thus, a lies to the left of the original
optimum a; i.e., it is smaller.
63 Data and Sample
We use data from the 2002 Eurobarometer (58.2), a survey covering 15 European
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
The survey contains information on socio-demographic characteristics of the respon-
dents, and health and attitudes towards risk. In particular, among other subjects, this
issue of the Eurobarometer survey gathered information on the respondents' views on
blood and organ donation. We use the answers to the following questions:
The rst question (Q59) is on blood donation and it is phrased as `Have you
donated in the past?' This question can be answered with a `Yes' or `No'. The
second question (Q60), on attitudes towards rewards for blood donation, asks `In
your opinion, should someone who gives blood ...?' The possible answers were:
 receive a xed fee of:
{ 10 Euros (Yes/No)
{ 25 Euros (Yes/No)
{ 100 Euros (Yes/No).
 be allowed to do so during working hours (Yes/No)
 be reimbursed for the expenses incurred (Yes/No)
 receive a small non-monetary gift (Yes/No)
 not receive anything (Yes/No)
As reported in Table 1, about 35 per cent of our sample of 8,821 European indi-
viduals have donated blood. Looking at the blood donors column, we observe that
86 per cent of donors do not think donors should be rewarded with a monetary com-
pensation, while fourteen per cent believe they should. Eighty-two per cent of the
non-donors think money should not be provided for blood donation and eighteen per
cent believe it should. These percentages are all signicantly dierent at the ve per
cent level.
In Figure 1 we plot the percentages of donors and non-donors who believe that
e10, e25, and e100 should be given for blood donation. The graph shows negatively
7sloped oer curves for both donors and non-donors, i.e., the higher the price oered,
the less people chose it as the right answer. Most signicantly, the non-donors' curve
appears to the right of the donors' one.
Table 2 displays a further summary of responses to these key questions by the
respondents' socio-demographic characteristics and by their choices with regards to
monetary versus non-monetary rewards. We notice from column one that more males
have donated blood than females have (forty-one versus thirty per cent). Also, those
living in Nordic European countries are more likely to have given blood than those in
Central Europe (thirty-six per cent versus thirty-ve per cent), the latter being more
likely to have donated blood than the Mediterranean countries (thirty-four per cent).
The second group of columns show that eighteen per cent of the male respondents
believe that monetary rewards should be given to donors and their reservation price
(average amount) is e30.06. Sixteen per cent of females believe money should be
oered and the average amount is very similar (e29.06). The regional dierences
in this table are remarkable. Although the Mediterranean countries have a similar
percentage of donors to those of North and Central Europe (34 to 36 per cent), fewer
Mediterranean individuals are in favour of monetary rewards for blood donation (six
per cent as opposed to fteen and twenty-ve per cent), but on average they choose
higher monetary rewards for donation { with an average of e52.77 as opposed to
e23.78 and e28.29, respectively. These regional dierences with respect to attitudes
towards rewards could be explained by the levels of income per capita and/or the levels
of social capital and trust in the institutions, although a more rened multivariate
analysis is required to explore the dierences behind these bivariate frequencies.
Finally, in the last column we report the percentages of those choosing non-
monetary rewards for blood donation: sixty-seven per cent of males agree with a
non-monetary reward, while sixty-nine per cent of females do so. The percentages of
Mediterranean, Nordic and Central European respondents who choose non-monetary
rewards are sixty, seventy-eight and sixty-six, respectively. The row at the bottom
of Table 2 summarizes the information broken down above for the aggregate, i.e.,
thirty-ve per cent of the sample have donated blood, the average reward for the
seventeen per cent favouring monetary rewards is e29.55, and 68 per cent of the full
sample are in favour of non-monetary rewards.
Table 3 presents denitions and sample statistics of the key variables used in the
empirical analysis. Our sample consists of individuals who are on average 45.7 years
8of age. Forty-seven per cent are male, twenty-four per cent nished their studies
by fteen years of age, thirty-eight per cent nished by the time they were between
sixteen and nineteen years of age, twenty-nine per cent nished education past their
twentieth year and eight per cent of the sample was still studying at the time of the
survey. Thirty-one per cent were unmarried or separated, fty-two per cent married
or living with a partner, nine per cent divorced, and eight per cent widowed. Our
sample is distributed equally between dierent types of dwellings: villages (thirty-four
per cent), towns (thirty-four per cent), and big cities (thirty-two per cent). Forty-
seven per cent of individuals were employed at the time of the survey, seven per
cent self-employed, and an outstanding forty-six per cent not working. Regarding
self-perceived health, six per cent of the sample felt in very bad health, twenty-ve
per cent fairly healthy, forty-three per cent healthy, and twenty six per cent felt they
were in very good health. Twenty-nine per cent of our sample had been suering from
a long-standing illness. About forty per cent reported engaging in regular vigorous
activity at an average of 257 minutes per week (102 minutes for the full sample).
With respect to attitudes towards risk, fourteen per cent of the sample felt that blood
transfusion was less safe in 2002 than in 1992; twenty per cent felt it was as safe and
sixty-six per cent thought that blood transfusion was safer in 2000. Finally, we report
the answer to the question on how much concern others show towards oneself because
we believe it may capture how much solidarity the respondent perceives in her/his
environment, and that could inuence altruistic tendencies. Five per cent of our
sample felt other people do not show concern about what they are doing, fourteen
per cent thought other people show little concern, forty-seven per cent felt that other
people show some concern, and thirty-four per cent declared others showed a lot of
concern.
In the next section, we describe our empirical approach to addressing the questions
of interest.
4 Empirical Strategy: A Recursive Equation Sys-
tem
Our empirical approach relies on two hypotheses. First, there are unobserved indi-
vidual characteristics that inuence both the decision of donating blood and the views
on rewarding blood donation { for instance, being highly altruistic or family history.
9Thus, the error terms of equations trying to explain having donated blood and beliefs
on rewarding blood donation with money or other rewards will be correlated. Second,
beyond that unobserved correlation, individual preferences towards rewards for blood
donation may have a direct inuence on the likelihood of having donated blood but
not vice versa.2 Accordingly, to answer the question of whether being in favour of
monetary/non-monetary rewards is related to having donated blood, we estimate two
recursive systems: one for donation and monetary reward, and the other for donation
and other reward. The system for binary blood donation (y1) and binary reward (y2)















02 + u2 (6)
In (5) and (6), the error terms [u1;u2]0 are assumed to be distributed as bivariate
normal with zero means, unitary variances, and correlation  1    1; the vari-
ances are assumed to be unitary because observed outcomes for y1 and y2 are both
binary. Vectors x;z; and w are observed individual traits such that x aects both
blood donation and reward, z determines donation only, and w determines reward
only; together, these variables constitute the individual demographics (D) and envi-
ronmental factors (E) which enter the utility function (equations (1) and (2)). Unique
variables z in the donation equation (5) and w in the reward equation (6) serve to
identify the model parameters..









where the composite error term u
1 = u1 + u2, and the error vector [u
1;u2]0 is dis-
tributed as bivariate normal with zero means, nite variances [!2
1;1]0, and correlation
 = ( + )=!1; where !1 =
p
1 + 21 + 2
1: Based on the reduced form equations
(7) and (6), binary donation and reward are characterized by
yi = 1 if y
i > 0
= 0 if y
i  0; i = 1;2: (8)
2We estimated alternative specications in which donation is allowed to aect the likelihood of
favouring monetary (and non-monetary) rewards. The eect was found to be insignicant, which
oers empirical support for our specication of a recursive system.
10To allow for the fact that countries from dierent regions may have very dierent
cultural and social backgrounds, dierent levels of social capital and trust in the
institutions, as well as blood collection habits and infrastructures, we also estimate
a model in which country dummy variables are interacted with latent reward (y
2 )
in (5). This amounts to making the coecient  of the latent reward a function of
regional dummy variables d with parameter vector :
 = d
0: (9)
To simplify notations, express the deterministic components on the right-hand
sides of the reduced forms (7) and (6) as h01 and h02, respectively, where h =
[x0;z0;w0]0 is the concatenated variable vector and 1 and 2 are conformable parameter
vectors which are functions of the structural parameters in (5) and (6). Then, the







where 1 and 2 are dichotomous indicators dened as i = 2yi   1; i = 1;2, 2 is
the standard bivariate normal cumulative distribution function, and \all" indicates
multiplication over all sample observations.
We present the results in the next section and discuss them in the following section.
5 Results
We rst present estimates of the recursive equations system models of having donated
described above. Secondly, we provide country specic estimates of the coecient
associated with being in favour of monetary rewards (and of non-monetary rewards).
Table 4 presents the results for the recursive systems of having been a donor, and
being in favour of monetary rewards and non-monetary rewards for blood donation,
respectively. The top panel contains estimates for the system in which being in favour
of monetary rewards is considered. The bottom panel presents the results for being
in favour of a non-monetary rewards system. The rst column in each specication
reports estimates for the donation equation and the second column for the rewards
equation. We have chosen to present the results starting with the most parsimonious
specication and then moving on to specications that include an increasing number
of controls. This is done to illustrate the robustness of the main coecients of interest.
11For both models, when estimating the probability of having donated, the rst
specication controls for self-assessed health, having a chronic illness, and gender;
the second specication adds age and level of education; the third includes marital
status and the level of urbanisation (rural, village, urban). The fourth specication
additionally controls for country of origin and, the last one, model e, adds to that the
level of physical activity and the individual perceived solidarity towards oneself, viz.,
perceived degree of concern from others.
When estimating the likelihood of being in favour of a particular type of reward
for blood donation, the rst specication controls for gender and income; the second
incorporates employment status, age and education; the third adds marital status;
and the fourth and fth additionally control for country of origin. In sum, in the
benchmark specication, the blood donation equation identifying variables, z; are
those related to health, physical activity, belief that blood donation is safer, type of
dwelling, and perceived concern from others. The variables that identify the rewards
equation, w, are income and employment status.
On favouring monetary rewards for donation, the top row of the top panel contains
the coecients associated with being in favour of monetary rewards in the equation
explaining the probability of having donated blood for the dierent specications. The
coecient is {0.593 and signicant at the 95 per cent level of condence for the rst
and most parsimonious specication. This coecient becomes {0.784 and signicant
at the 99 per cent level of condence in the second specication and remains very
close in magnitude to those in subsequent specications (i.e., taking values {0.793,
{0.760 and {0.762). This coecient is robust to dierent specications and thus the
negative association between being in favour of monetary rewards for blood donation
and the likelihood of having donated blood hints at the crowding out eect of paying
for blood donation. That is, donors are less likely to favour monetary compensation
for donation.
The bottom panel contains estimates for the donation-non-monetary system. The
rst row shows the coecients associated with believing that non-monetary rewards
for blood donation should be provided in the equation explaining the probability of
having donated blood in the dierent specications (from left to right). The coecient
is 0.052 and insignicant for the rst specication; it remains insignicant and around
0.05 for the next two specications, which do not control for countries of origin. When
countries of origin are incorporated in the fourth and fth specications, the coecient
12becomes about 0.3 and signicant at the 95 per cent level of condence. Although
this coecient is not as robust as that associated with believing in monetary rewards,
these estimates suggest that those in favour of non-monetary rewards are less likely
to have donated blood.
The estimates for our benchmark (last) model can be found in Table 5. We
briey summarize below the most interesting and signicant results. Looking at the
estimates for the recursive model system of donation and monetary rewards in Table
5, we notice that, as expected, believing that donating blood is much safer than
before is associated with a higher likelihood of donation, as are age, education level,
gender (being male) and, surprisingly, widowhood. The positive coecient of being
male may be explained by physical reasons, viz., donors have to be above a certain
body weight, and pregnancy, breast-feeding and anaemia are not conducive to blood
donation. With respect to the likelihood of favouring monetary rewards, we observe
that being employed and self-employed (as opposed to unemployed) have a negative
eect, as do age and being divorced. Income, having been in the education system
until 20 years of age, and being male have a positive coecient.
The estimates for the recursive system of donation and non-monetary rewards
indicate that, again, being male, belief that blood donation has become safer, age,
and education also have positive impacts on the donation equation, while widowhood
is now negatively correlated with donation. With respect to the likelihood of favouring
non-monetary rewards, we nd that being employed has a positive coecient while
being self-employed and being a widow have negative eects.
Controlling for countries of origin has an important eect on the coecients of
interest. This is expected because of the dierent country-specic infrastructures for
collecting blood, cultures and levels of social capital. For that reason, we estimate a
modication of the benchmark model above by interacting latent rewards with coun-
try dummy variables, as described in (9). Table 6 displays the country-specic coe-
cients for the association between believing in (monetary and non-monetary) rewards
for blood donation and actually having donated. The most remarkable conclusion
from this country analysis is that all countries show a similar negative association
between believing in monetary rewards and donation, and thus, monetary rewards
for blood donation could potentially mean a crowdout of blood supply of similar mag-
nitudes. The second notable nding is that the positive coecient of non-monetary
rewards obtained without the country dummy interactions does not hold for any
13country except for Austria, with a coecient of 0.348 which is signicant at the 99
per cent condence level. Most interestingly, for Italy and Sweden, the coecient is
negative but only signicant at the 90 per cent condence level. For the remaining
countries, the association is not signicant.
In the next section we discuss these results and conclude.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
This paper analyses the question of whether oering monetary rewards for blood do-
nation might crowd out blood supply and whether non-monetary rewards would have
the same eect. We examine these questions drawing on a large survey representa-
tive of individuals in fteen European countries containing individual information on
blood donation and the favouring of monetary and non-monetary rewards for blood
donation. Our results indicate that those who believe that monetary rewards should
be given for blood donation are less likely to have donated blood, while those favour-
ing non-monetary rewards instead are equally or more likely to have donated blood.
These results suggest that oering monetary rewards for blood donation might indeed
crowd out blood supply as the `altruistic types' are not favouring monetary rewards.
Nevertheless, the results indicate that there would be no supply displacement of this
type if non-monetary rewards were oered instead. Thus, non-monetary rewards
could potentially be used to incentivise blood donation as this kind of rewards seems
not to remove, in the terminology of Andreoni et al. (2007), the warm-glow associated
with blood giving. This point was suggested already by the experimental results of
Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008), which we generalize.
We also nd that there are strong gender dierences in our results. First of all,
males in our sample are more likely to be donors, more likely to favour monetary
rewards but not more likely to be in favour of non-monetary rewards. As noted
earlier, males may be more likely to be donors for physical reasons (e.g., higher body
weight, absence of pregnancy and lactation period, and lower likelihood of being
anaemic). Other explanations include the fact that some countries organise blood
drives to factories and other places with a higher percentage of males { and even
motivate very strongly those in the military service to give blood as is the case in
14Austria.3
Another remarkable nding of this paper is that although we conrm that country
of origin is a very signicant source of variation, a more detailed analysis at the
country level reveals that the association of favouring monetary rewards and blood
donation is uniformly negative and very signicant across all countries. Nevertheless,
the country coecients for the association between non-monetary rewards and blood
donation is much more heterogeneous, with Austria showing a strongly positive and
signicant sign but Italy and Sweden showing the opposite.
While this paper presents one of the rst attempts at investigating the crowding
out issue using large multi-country survey data from Europe, a few caveats per-
tain. First, our data come from a cross sectional database which, while large and
representative of fteen European countries, imposes important restrictions on the
interpretation of the results. Also, the denition of a donor in the data is very wide
one and includes any person that has ever donated blood. Therefore, we can suitably
measure donor identity but not intensity of blood donation as we cannot distinguish
regular from non-regular donors. Further, our analysis seeks to establish associations
between individual information related to `beliefs' (being in favour of a type of reward
for blood donation) with an `act realisation' (having donated blood). The hypotheti-
cal nature of the stated `beliefs' may therefore weaken the argument we are trying to
make. Finally, we choose to allow favouring of rewards to have a direct association
with being a donor but not vice versa because while bad experiences donating blood
could aect beliefs about rewarding for blood donation (to compensate for pain, for
instance) this is unlikely and in our favour previous specications ruled out this direct
reverse causality of donation on beliefs.
Our results suggest that altruistic actions may be incentivised as long as the incen-
tives do not interfere with the self-identity/image of the individual as a donor. Thus,
to deal with blood shortages, policies geared towards the provision of non-monetary
incentives could be implemented. This is compatible with the notion of nudging be-
haviour to full a wider social policy objective. That is, altruistic behaviour could
be motivated by non-monetary means and thus nudge individuals to act in a manner
that provides collective benet.
3In Austria there is an agreement between the army and the Red Cross. The army motivates
blood donation by allowing donors to leave for the weekend earlier on the Friday after blood donation
and the Red Cross provides the blood group test for free (Fiala, 1997).
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18Table 1
Frequencies of Preferences Towards Rewards
Donors Non-donors Full sample
35% 65% 100%
Monetary reward
No 86% 82% 83%
Yes 14% 18% 17%
Other reward
No 33% 32% 32%
Yes 67% 68% 68%
Note: All dierences are signicant at the 5% signicance level.
19Table 2
Donation and Rewards by Gender and Geographic Area
% that Monetary reward Non-monetary
have donated Mean amount among reward:
blood % favouring those favouring (e) % favouring
Gender
Male 41:30 17:52 30:06 67:22
(30:51)
Female 29:63 15:83 29:06 68:53
(30:61)
Area
Mediterranean 33:71 6:05 52:77 59:69
(41:72)
Nordic 36:07 15:43 23:78 77:97
(25:08)
Central Europe 35:26 25:37 28:29 65:90
(28:82)
Full sample 35:06 16:62 29:55 67:92
(30:56)
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses.
20Table 3
Denitions and Sample Statistics of Explanatory Variables
Variable Denition Mean
Continuous explanatory variables
Age Age in years 45:72
(17:28)
Income Total wages and salaries per month, including 13971:40
pensions, child benets, and other rents (3315:13)
Vigorous activity Vigorous physical activity (minutes/week) 101:91
(173:56)
Among those who exercise vigorously (39:59% 257:42
of sample) (189:91)
Binary explanatory variables (yes = 1; no = 0)
Male Gender is male 0:47
Education
Education 1 Finished full-time education when age < 15 (ref.) 0:24
Education 2 Finished full-time education when 16  age  19 0:38
Education 3 Finished full-time education when age  20 0:29
Education 4 Still studying 0:08
Marital status





Village Living in rural area or village 0:34
Town Living in small or middle-sized town 0:34
City Living in large town (ref.) 0:32
Employment
Employed Currently employed 0:47
Self-employed Currently self-employed 0:07




Health very bad Self-assessed health (SAH) is very bad or bad (ref.) 0.06
Health fair SAH is fair 0.25
Health good SAH is good 0.43
Health very good SAH is very good 0.26
Standing illness Suering from long-standing illness 0.29
Safety in blood donation
Less safe Blood transfusion less safe than 10 years ago (ref.) 0.14
As safe Blood transfusion as safe as 10 years ago 0.20
Safer Blood transfusion safer than 10 years ago 0.66
Concern from others
No concern Receive no concern (from others) 0.05
Little concern Receive little concern 0.14
Some concern Receive some concern 0.47
Lots of concern Receive lots of concern 0.34
Note: Standard deviations in parentheses. For households who did not respond to
the income question, we imputed income based on age, sex, marital status, education,
health and number of members in the family.
22Simultaneous Equation Model of Donation and Beliefs towards Rewards (Pooled Sample)
Variable Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff















Error corr. (rho) 0.489 0.316 0.704 0.103 *** 0.712 0.099 *** 0.654 0.136 *** 0.658 0.135 ***
Variable Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff Coeff S.E. Coeff















Error corr. (rho) -0.060 9.936 -0.068 0.126 -0.075 0.129 -0.332 0.149 ** -0.3631 0.1508 **






Model a Model b Model c Model d
Donate Non-Monetary 
Rewards
YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES
Donate Monetary 
Rewards Donate Monetary Rewards Donate
Table 4
Model a Model b Model c Model d Model e
Donate Monetary Rewards Donate Monetary Rewards
S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E. S.E.
Monetary Rewards
YES YES YES YES YES
YES
YES
YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES











YES YES YES YES
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YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES







YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES
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YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
YES YES YES YES YES
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Maximum-Likelihood Estimates of Recursive Equation Systems
Monetary Non-monetary
Variable Donation reward Donation reward
Reward  0:762 0:352
(0:119) (0:151)
Health fair  0:058  0:052
(0:051) (0:062)
Health good  0:017 0:0007
(0:053) (0:065)
Health very good 0:017 0:043
(0:057) (0:070)
Vigorous activity 0:010 0:013
(0:007) (0:008)
Standing illness 0:002  0:013
(0:029) (0:035)










Male 0:363 0:178 0:301  0:043
(0:041) (0:038) (0:032) (0:030)
Age / 10 0:042  0:038 0:090  0:0004
(0:117) (0:016) (0:012) (0:013)
Education 2 0:363 0:178 0:272  0:012




Variable Donation reward Donation reward
Education 3 0:175  0:024 0:357 0:006
(0:060) (0:053) (0:052) (0:045)
Education 4 0:251  0:023  0:032  0:106
(0:073) (0:057) (0:084) (0:075)
Married  0:043  0:026 0:004  0:037
(0:090) (0:092) (0:038) (0:038)
Divorced  0:034  0:102  0:002 0:002
(0:049) (0:048) (0:057) (0:059)
Widowed 0:148  0:006  0:155  0:124





Little concern  0:061  0:074
(0:057) (0:069)
Some concern  0:056  0:061
(0:052) (0:063)
Lots of concern  0:048  0:049
(0:053) (0:065)
Constant  1:780  1:341  1:236 0:668
(0:141) (0:128) (0:142) (0:116)
Countries controled Yes Yes
Error corr. 0:658  0:363
(0:135) (0:151)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses. Asterisks *** indicate
statistical signicance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10%
level.
24Table 6
Country-Specic Association Between Rewards and Donation
Donation-money reward Donation-other reward
Estimate S.E. Estimate S.E.
Greece  0:907*** 0:086  0:019 0:131
Belgium  0:619*** 0:132  0:155 0:142
Denmark  0:835*** 0:097  0:008 0:122
W. Germany  0:791*** 0:100 0:004 0:131
Italy  0:598*** 0:131  0:244* 0:143
Spain  0:782*** 0:104 0:051 0:138
France  0:893*** 0:084 0:053 0:128
Ireland  0:907*** 0:090  0:003 0:143
N. Ireland  0:931*** 0:098 0:160 0:156
Luxembourg  0:679*** 0:126  0:114 0:139
Netherlands  0:676*** 0:121  0:195 0:132
Portugal  0:726*** 0:119  0:101 0:134
Britain  0:839*** 0:090 0:130 0:137
E. Germany  0:740*** 0:112 0:061 0:130
Finland  0:878*** 0:087 0:082 0:126
Sweden  0:700*** 0:118  0:234* 0:123
Austria  1:175*** 0:058 0:348*** 0:132
Note: Asterisks *** indicate statistical signicance at the 1% level
and * at the 10% level.
25Figure 1 : Percentage of donors and non-donors choosing positive 
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